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This paper investigates how technical and social skills of financial analysts affect their 
performance and career advancement. Using a sample of LinkedIn profiles of financial analysts, 
we document that analysts with good social skill, proxied by the number of social connections, 
generate more accurate earnings forecasts and produce more informative stock recommendations. 
These analysts are also more likely to be voted as All-Star analysts and to move to high-status 
brokers when changing jobs. However, the effect of technical skills, proxied by the quantitative 
skills disclosed on LinkedIn, only affect earnings forecast accuracy. The analysts with technical 
skills are indifferent in the likelihood of being voted as star analysts and job separations comparing 
with other analysts. These findings provide the first large sample evidence that social skills are 








Analyzing the Analysts:  
The Effect of Technical and Social Skills on Analyst Career 
 
1. Introduction 
Every year buy-side institutions are solicited to vote for the Institutional Investor All-
American Research Teams and provide opinions on the most valuable attributes of analysts.  These 
attributes are both “soft” (such as industry knowledge, accessibility and responsiveness, and 
special service) and “hard” (such as financial models and earnings estimates).1 Institutions always 
rank those “soft” attributes at the top and far ahead of “hard” ones, suggesting that there is a huge 
demand for “soft” attributes. Prior academic research has identified the value of analysts to 
investors in both their depth of information analysis and the breath of information search 
(Bradshaw 2011, Brown et al. 2015). While we have identified many determinants of analyst 
performance and career outcome over last two decades, we haven’t explored the effect of analyst 
technical and social skills on their career. These skills, particularly social skills, may be highly 
associated with the “soft” features valued by institutional investors.  The recent emergence of 
social media such as LinkedIn makes such an inquiry possible. Using self-disclosed quantitative 
skills as the proxy for technical skills and the size of social connections as the proxy for social 
skills, in this paper we examine how technical and social skills of financial analysts affect their 
performance such as forecast accuracy and stock recommendation informativeness and their career 
outcome. 
Technical and social skills are both important for an individual’s success on the labor 
market. A number of prior studies find that employees’ technical skills are positively associated 
with performance and productivity. For example, Abraham and Spletzer (2009) provide evidence 
                                                 
1 Institutional Investor Magazine holds voting every year and publishes the results in October. 
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that technical skills are highly rewarded in the labor market based on U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey (CPS). Technical skills are also the basic qualification for a financial analyst. 
Financial analyst job listings usually require the candidates to have certain level of technical skills, 
for example, financial modelling, or equity valuation. Surveys and interviews with financial 
analysts suggest that technical skills are components of client or institutional investor votes which 
are highly related to analysts’ compensation (Brown et al. 2015, Groysberg et al. 2011, Yin and 
Zhang 2014).  
People with good social skills often establish a sizable social network. Social connections 
are widely studied in the economic and psychology literature. For example, Karlan et al. (2009) 
find that social connections smooth and secure information transfer. Baker (2000) shows that social 
connections are an important source of social capital which is critical for information acquisition. 
Analysts with broad social connections have more information sources which include senior 
officers from target firms, peers, financial journalists, customers, suppliers, and competitors. The 
information received from various social connections can potentially help financial analysts make 
better assessment about the firms and improve their performance. Social connections may also 
help advance analysts’ career directly in two channels. First, social connections reduce the 
information asymmetry between employers and potential employees. Second, prior labor market 
literature suggests that the size of social connections reflects a person’s social skills which play a 
significant role in communicating with others. Theses social skills have been perceived more and 
more important in the analyst profession. For example, Hong and Kubik (2003) describe All-Star 
voting as “beauty contest” and indicate that financial analysts heavily lobby institutional investor 
before the vote. Brown et al. (2015) show that winning client or broker’s votes is the most 
important attribute in an analyst’s career opportunities. Overall, these studies imply that analysts 
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with more social connections are more likely to have better performance and favorable career 
outcomes.  
We obtain the names of all U.S. financial analysts who have issued at least one stock 
recommendation in the I/B/E/S database in 2014. We manually collect the LinkedIn profiles of 
these analysts and extract data on several analyst attributes, including social connections, skill sets, 
and other individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, experience). We use the number of 
connections that analysts have reported on their LinkedIn profiles to proxy for social skills. We 
proxy technical skills as the number of quantitative skills (e.g., financial modelling, equity 
valuation, derivatives) reported within their top five endorsed types of expertise on LinkedIn 
profiles.  
We first examine whether analysts’ forecast accuracy varies across their technical skills 
and social connections. The results show that analysts with technical skills or more social 
connections have lower earnings forecast errors, suggesting that both attributes significantly 
improve analyst forecast accuracy. We further examine whether technical skills and social 
connections affect the informativeness of analyst stock recommendations. We find that both buy 
and sell recommendations from analysts with more social connections have a greater price impact 
on stock returns. Specifically, market reaction is up to 0.65% (-0.80%) on their upgrade 
(downgrade) stock recommendation when they have more than 396 LinkedIn connections. 2 
Interestingly, we find no evidence that analysts with strong technical skills are associated with a 
more informative stock recommendation. This result suggests that the broad connection of analysts 
may play a more important role in stock selection.  
                                                 
2 396 is the median value of the number of connections. Our results are robust when we use an alternative cutoff 
value 500.  For any connections more than 500, LinkedIn reports the connections as 500+.  
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We next investigate whether technical skills and social connections affect analyst career 
outcome. We focus on two primary career outcomes; namely, whether the analyst is voted as All-
Star by institutional investors, and whether the analyst moves from a low-status brokerage house 
to a high-status brokerage house (Hong and Kubik 2003). Our results suggest that financial 
analysts with more social connections are more likely to be voted as star analysts, and are more 
likely to be promoted to high-status brokers. In contrast, we find that technical skills have no effect 
on helping analysts become All-Stars and the evidence on the effect of technical skills on analysts’ 
job switch is mixed. This evidence is consistent with the fact that the features associated with social 
skills are becoming more important in Institutional Investor’s surveys in recent years and also 
supports the argument that one’s social network is beneficial to career advancement.  
Our results persist after controlling for a host of widely documented analyst, brokerage, 
and firm characteristics including forecast frequency, forecast horizon, experience, lagged forecast 
error, number of firms and number of industries that the analyst follows, brokerage size, firm size, 
market-to-book, and return on assets. We also perform several additional tests. Our results are 
robust for using alternative analyst forecast error measures and excluding analysts without 
available LinkedIn profiles. Our results are also consistent if we use the highest number of 
endorsement on LinkedIn profile as an alternative measure of social skills. Taken together, our 
results suggest that both technical skills and social connections are important in determining 
analyst performance but connections play a more significant role in the career outcome. 
Our study makes contributions to several streams of literature. First, it expands our 
knowledge about the linkage between analysts’ characteristics and their performance. Based on 
the information available on LindedIn, we propose two measures to proxy for technical and social 
skills, respectively. We find that analysts with technical skills and social connections generate more 
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accurate forecasts while only social connection has a direct impact on analyst career outcome such 
as being voted as All-star analysts. These results show a new angle to understand the nature of 
analysts’ professional expertise. 
Second, our study contributes to the labor economics literature. We decompose analysts’ 
skills into technical and social components. This decomposition enables us to see how these skills 
are valued by investors and brokers. Our study is the first large sample empirical study showing 
that financial analysts with better social skills proxied by the number of connections are more 
likely to be voted as All-stars by institutional investors or to be promoted to a more resourceful 
brokerage house. Out study thus suggests both investors and employers value social skills more 
than technical skills. The findings may be generalizable and thus highlight the importance of 
training in school and hiring practice in the corporate world.  
Third, our study adds to the growing literature about the impact of social networks on the 
capital markets. Prior research has focused on the role of a specific social tie (e.g., alumni tie, work 
tie) in information transfer among managers, mutual funds, and financial analysts (Cohen et al. 
2008, 2010, Gu et al. 2014, Fang and Huang 2015). We investigate a broader definition of social 
network, namely, the size of the social network. Our results suggest that the size of the social 
network affect both analyst performance and career advancement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the key variables. Section 4 discusses 






2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Performance of Financial Analysts and Skills 
Financial analysts are among the most important information intermediary in revealing 
information in the capital market. A large part of a financial analyst’s job is to research, produce, 
and report forecast on firms’ future performance, and translate their forecasts into stock 
recommendations (Cohen et al. 2010). Prior research on the performance of financial analysts 
examines whether analyst attributes, brokerage house traits, and firm characteristics affect forecast 
accuracy and the profitability of stock recommendation. For example, Stickel (1992) shows that 
star analysts have better forecast accuracy. Clement (1999) finds that analysts’ experience, their 
portfolio complexity, and brokerage size have a positive association with their forecasts’ accuracy. 
Malloy (2005) and Bae et al. (2008) find that local analysts are significantly more accurate than 
other non-local analysts. Kumar (2010) documents that female analysts issue bolder and more 
accurate forecasts. Clement and Law (2014) suggest that analysts who begin their career in an 
economic recession are more conservative in their forecasts.3 A number of studies also find that 
analysts with alumni or work ties with managers or directors have better forecast performance and 
enjoy other benefits in their career outcome (Cohen et al 2010, Gu et al. 2014, Fang and Huang 
2015). Although these studies advance our understanding of the determinants of the financial 
analyst performance, we are not clear which type of skills help analysts improve their performance. 
The skills do not limit to technical skills such as financial modelling and equity valuation, but also 
include social skills such as an expanding social network and communicating with others. 
According to the annual Institutional Investor surveys over the last decade, all top ranked features 
                                                 
3 Brown et al. (2010) find that financial analysts with background disclosure events (e.g., criminal actions, customer 
complaints, bankruptcies, regulatory actions) have less accurate forecast. Chang et al. (2016a, 2016b) find that the 
complexity of derivatives reduces analyst forecast accuracy.  
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are more or less social skills based, for example, industry knowledge, special service, 
responsiveness. Stock selection and earnings forecasts were ranked as high as second and fifth in 
1998, but have been falling out of the top 10 features in the ranks during the recent years. These 
perceptions suggest that both social and technical skills may affect the performance and the career 
outcome of financial analysts. While practitioners consider social skills important, few prior 
academic studies look into the effect of such skills on their performance with a large sample. 
Social connections reflect one aspect of social skills. A large body of work in social 
psychology and economics suggests that social connections play a crucial role in labor market 
outcomes. Social connections are perceived to be correlated with intelligence and social skills.  
Individuals who have better social skills are more confident in communicating with others and 
thus build a broader social network. Meanwhile, wider social connections help individuals broaden 
information source, generate ideas, acquire knowledge, and identify opportunities (Baker 2000). 
All of these benefits, in return, help individuals build confidence as well as social and 
communication skills (Mobius and Rosenblat 2006), and as a result, a job candidate with a broader 
social network is more likely to be employed with higher pay (Munshi 2003).  
Financial analysts can benefit from social connections in both performance and career 
opportunities. Karlan et al. (2009) suggests that social connections between individuals can be 
used as social collateral to secure information borrowing. In their model, social connections build 
trust which enforces an informal contract between individuals. Prior studies have identified the 
value of analysts to the capital market in assembling the mosaic of information available to them 
(Huang et al. 2015, Bradshaw et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2010). Social connections can expand the 
breadth of analysts’ information mosaic search which includes peers, financial journalists, a firm’s 
customers, a firm’s suppliers, and a firm’s competitors in addition to access to management. Two 
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recent studies document that analysts revise their forecasts based on the tone of the financial press, 
suggesting that analysts incorporate information from financial journalists (Huang and Mamo 2014, 
Bradshaw et al. 2014). Bradshaw (2011) shows that firms’ suppliers, customers, and competitors 
play a crucial role in analysts’ information search process. Hugon et al. (2016) find that analysts 
who are exposed to macroeconomists have better forecast accuracy and their forecast revisions are 
perceived to be more credible by investors.4 Overall, these findings suggest that social connections 
can improve analyst performance, namely, forecast accuracy and profitability of stock 
recommendation, by broadening the sources of information.  
Technical skills are the required qualification for the labor market. The job postings for 
financial analyst usually require a certain level of technical skills, for example, financial modelling, 
or equity valuation. These skills can be acquired by taking courses or having relevant work 
experience. A number of studies find that the level of workers’ technical skills is positively 
associated with performance and productivity (Abraham and Spletzer 2009), so we conjecture that 
financial analysts with strong technical skills have more accurate earnings forecast and more 
informative stock recommendations.  
 Summarizing the above discussions, we have the following hypothesis: 
H1A: Analysts with technical skills and social connections have better forecast accuracy. 
H1B: Analysts with technical skills and social connections issue more informative stock 
recommendation. 
Establishing social connections could also be costly. Maintaining social connections need 
effort and time and can cause distractions from work and impair the investment in technical skills.  
Indeed, social psychology studies find that students participating in many clubs are observed to 
                                                 




have weak academic performance. In addition, it is possible that financial analysts produce 
information by independent research without reaching out to their connections, for example, 
googling and analyzing the reports from firms’ suppliers and customers instead of direct interaction 
with them. These counter arguments would weaken the effect of social connections on financial 
analyst performance. 
2.2. Career Outcome of Financial Analysts and Skills 
Social connections can influence the career outcome of financial analysts through two 
channels. First, more social connections imply more potential referrals. These potential referrals 
can provide job candidates with information about job opportunities that they otherwise would not 
have. Moreover, these referrals help reduce the information asymmetry in the labor market and 
benefit both firms and new hires. Dustmann et al. (2015) derive a theoretical model suggesting 
that referrals provide hiring information through the network instead of formal hiring channels. 
New workers hired through referrals are better matched to the firms than workers hired through 
the external market. Burks et al. (2015) indicate that referred workers have a lower turnover rate 
than nonreferred workers.   
Second, social connections are perceived to correlate with confidence, social skills and 
intelligence which can generate labor market premiums for job candidates (Litecky et al. 2004, 
Mobius and Rosenblat 2006, Biddle and Hamermesh 1994, 1998). Prior labor economic literature 
finds that job candidates with better social skills are more likely to be hired and to be favorably 
treated by employers. In a recent survey conducted by Brown et al. (2015), 83% of financial 
analysts indicate that broker or client votes are the most important trait for analyst career 
opportunities. Their finding suggests that building good client relationships is crucial for analyst 
career advancement. Overall, our conjecture is that analysts with more social connections are more 
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likely to be voted as All-Star analysts and are more likely to be promoted from smaller or less 
accurate to larger or more accurate brokerage houses. 
A growing body of work examines the alumni or work tie and information transfer. For 
example, Cohen et al. (2010) document that analysts with alumni ties with mangers have more 
accurate forecasts and more informative stock recommendations. Gu et al. (2014) find that work 
ties among mutual fund managers and financial analysts can benefit both parties. Fang and Huang 
(2015) introduce gender differences into the effect of alumni ties and suggest that alumni ties 
between managers and analysts only improve male analysts’ performance and their career outcome. 
Our social connections measure is different from these alumni or work ties in two aspects: first, 
our social connections capture the breadth of information search. It does not imply private 
information transfer from managers to financial analysts. Second, our social connections also 
reflect one type of qualitative skills - social skills of financial analysts. While there is some 
consensus in the literature on the association between technical skills and performance, the role of 
technical skills in analysts’ career advancement is less clear. On the one hand, a body of research 
documents that technical skills lead to better career outcomes. For example, Abraham and Spletzer 
(2009) provide evidence that technical skills are highly rewarded on the labor market based on 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS). Tambe (2014) finds that the labor market 
has a high demand of employees with technical skills because this intellectual capital is the 
determinant of firm productivity. On the other hand, technical skills are usually the necessary rather 
than sufficient qualification that helps the job candidate achieve certain type of career advancement. 
Prior studies suggest that strong technical skills are not sufficient for career advancement even for 
high-tech industries (Baron and Markman 2000, Litecky et al. 2004, 2009). Consistent with these 
studies, the ranks of financial modelling, earnings estimate, and stock selection have been 
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declining in the Institutional Investor ranking surveys during recent years. Taken together, the 
evidence on the association between technical skills and career advancement is mixed. We 
conjecture that analysts with technical skills are more likely to be voted as All-Star analysts, and 
are more likely to be promoted from smaller or less accurate brokerage houses to larger or more 
accurate brokerage houses. 
To summarize, we generate our second hypothesis: 
H2A: Analysts with technical skills and social connections are more likely to be voted as   
         All-Star. 
H2B: Analyst with technical skills and social connections are more likely to be promoted  
         from low-status brokers to high-status brokers. 
 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND KEY VARIABLES 
3.1. Sample Selection  
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection. We start with an initial sample of 7,112 U.S. 
financial analysts who have issued at least one earnings forecasts over the January 2014 to 
December 2015 period. We collect analyst annual earnings forecasts and stock recommendations 
from I/B/E/S, stock return data from CRSP, financial statement data from the Compustat Annual 
database, and All-American Research Team status from the Institutional Investor magazine. We 
exclude observations without I/B/E/S actual earnings information, stock return or financial 
statement data to calculate control variables. The final sample consists of 62,035 observations, 





3.2. LinkedIn Analyst Data  
We manually collect the LinkedIn profiles of these financial analysts. We focus on 
LinkedIn because it is the world’s largest professional networking website (Chen et al. 2015). We 
then use a Perl program to parse these LinkedIn profiles and extract data on several analyst 
attributes, including social connections, skills set, age, gender, education background, and 
employment history. Table 2 reports on the I/B/E/S analysts’ LinkedIn connections and technical 
skill set. In particular, Panel A of Table 2 shows that analysts’ LinkedIn connections range from 0 
to 500+, with a median of 396 connections. Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 1 present the frequency 
of each skill reported as top five skills on analyst LinkedIn profiles. Note that these skills have to 
be endorsed by their LinkedIn connections. A higher rank in analysts’ skill sets means this skill 
has more endorsements from their connections. We focus on the top five skills because these skills 
have more endorsements and thus are more credible. Not surprisingly, equity research, financial 
modelling, equities, and valuation are among the most commonly recognized skills of financial 
analysts. 47% and 43% of financial analysts have financial modelling and valuation in their skills 
set, respectively.  
3.3. Key Variables  
3.3.1. Analyst connections and technical skills 
Our key variables of interest include analysts’ connections and technical skills reported on 
LinkedIn. Since LinkedIn does not report the actual number of connections beyond 500, to address 
the potential measurement error problem of raw connections (Connect), we define well-connected 
analysts as those who have more than 396 LinkedIn connections and create an indicator variable 
(Connect) accordingly. We use 396 as a cutoff because it is the median value of social connections 
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reported in Table 2. In our additional analyses, we repeat the same tests using 500 as an alternative 
cutoff point. Our results are all robust.  
We proxy technical skills (Tech_Skills) as the number of technical skills reported within 
analysts’ top five endorsed expertise on LinkedIn profiles. Technical skills include financial 
modelling, equity valuation, valuation, derivatives, and comparative analysis.  
3.3.2. Analyst performance measures 
We construct two proxies for analyst performance, namely, earnings forecast accuracy and 
the price impact of stock recommendation. Earnings forecast accuracy is measured by earnings 
forecast error (AFE) which is defined as the absolute value of the analyst’s annual earnings forecast 
minus actual annual EPS for the firm-year, and then scaled by the stock price at the beginning of 
the year. Following Janakiraman et al. (2007) and Hugon et al. (2016), we focus on the analyst’s 
first earnings forecast and the stock recommendations in a firm-year because an information 
advantage of well-connected financial analysts could be timely access to information, which is 
likely more beneficial to earnings forecasts and recommendations made early in the year. The price 
impact of financial analysts’ stock recommendation is measured by the three-day cumulative 
abnormal size-adjusted returns surrounding the announcement date of the stock recommendation 
(CAR [-1,+1]).   
3.3.3. Analyst career outcome measures 
To examine the effect of technical skills and social connections on analysts’ career 
advancement, we rely on Institutional Investor’s All-Star analyst award status and a promotion 
measure constructed based on Institutional Investor’s rankings of brokerage firms. Each year, the 
Institutional Investor magazine polls institutional investors to vote for the top sell-side equity 
analysts and brokerage firms. We create an indicator variable (AA_Award) which is set to one if 
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the analyst is ranked in the top three in their respective industries or as a runner-up by Institutional 
Investor in year t, and zero otherwise. As for the analyst promotion, we follow Hong and Kubik 
(2003) by creating an indicator variable (Promotion) which is set to one if the analyst moves from 
a unranked brokerage firm to a brokerage firm ranked by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero 
otherwise.  
3.3.4. Control variables 
Based on the earnings forecast accuracy literature (e.g., Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; 
Lim 2001; Clement and Tse 2003), we control for earnings forecast frequency, Freq, forecast 
horizon, Horizon, brokerage firm size, BSize, number of firms followed, NFirm, number of 
industries followed, NInd, and firm experience, Exp. Regarding firm characteristics, we use firm 
size, Size, to proxy for the general information environment and market-to-book ratio, MTB, to 
proxy for growth firm. We control for firm performance, ROA, as better performing firms are 
presumably less difficult to forecast. In our tests for career outcome, we control for the analyst 
performance measures such as earnings forecast accuracy and analyst stock return profitability. A 
complete list of variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Analysts’ Connections and Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 Our hypothesis H1A asserts that analysts’ technical skills and social connections have a 
positive relationship with earnings forecast accuracy. To test this hypothesis, we regress earnings 
forecast error (AFE) on technical skills and social connections, controlling for forecast frequency, 
forecast horizon, brokerage firm size, number of firms followed, number of industries followed, 
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firm experience, firm size, market-to-book, and firm performance. Specifically, we estimate the 
following OLS model: 
 
AFEi,t  = 
 
β0 + β1 ∙ Connecti,t + β2 ∙ Tech_Skillsi,t + β3 ∙ Freqi,t + β4 ∙ Horizoni,t  
+ β5 ∙ BSizei,t + β6 ∙ NFirmi,t + β7 ∙ NIndi,t + β8 ∙ Expi,t + β9 ∙ Sizei,t  






4.2. Analysts’ Connections and the Informativeness of Stock Recommendations 
 Our hypothesis H1B asserts that analysts’ technical skills and social connections have a 
positive relationship with the informativeness of their stock recommendations. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate the following OLS model: 
 
CAR[-1,+1]  = 
 
β0 + β1 ∙ Connecti,t + β2 ∙ Tech_Skillsi,t + β3 ∙ BSizei,t + β4 ∙ NFirmi,t  
+ β5 ∙ NIndi,t + β6 ∙ Expi,t + β7 ∙ Sizei,t + β8 ∙ MTBi,t + Year Effects  





 We classify I/B/E/S’ strong buy and buy stock recommendations into the Buy category and 
I/B/E/S’ hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations into the Sell category. We also identify the 
recommendations upgraded (downgraded) from the same analysts’ most recent recommendations 
issued within one year and classify those recommendations into the Upgrade (Downgrade) 
category. Then, we estimate Equation (2) separately for each category. We expect incremental 
positive stock market reactions to well-connected analysts’ buy and upgraded recommendations, 





4.3. Analysts’ Connections and the All-Star Analyst Awards 
 Our hypothesis H2A asserts a positive relationship between analysts’ technical skills and 
social connections and the likelihood of receiving the All-American Research Team status. To test 
this hypothesis, we estimate the following Probit model: 
 
AA_Award  = 
 
β0 + β1 ∙ Connecti,t + β2 ∙ Tech_Skillsi,t + β3 ∙ Avg_AFEi,t  
+ β4 ∙ Avg_CAR[-1,+1]i,t + β5 ∙ Avg_Freqi,t + β6 ∙ BSizei,t  
+ β7 ∙ NFirmi,t + β8 ∙ NIndi,t + β9 ∙ AA_Awardi,t-1 + β10 ∙ Avg_Expi,t  






where AA_Award denotes All-American Research Team status, an indicator variable set to one if 
the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor in their respective 
industries in year t, and zero otherwise, and other variables are as previously defined. Note that for 
some control variables, we take the average of all firms in the analyst’s research portfolio during 
the year. 
4.4. Analysts’ Connections and Promotion to more Resourceful Brokerage Firm 
 Our hypothesis H2B asserts a positive relationship between analysts’ technical skills and 
social connections and the likelihood of advancing to a high-status brokerage firm. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate the following Probit model: 
 
Promotion  = 
 
β0 + β1 ∙ Connecti,t + β2 ∙ Tech_Skillsi,t + β3 ∙ Avg_AFEi,t  
+ β4 ∙ Avg_CAR[-1,+1]i,t + β5 ∙ Avg_Freqi,t + β6 ∙ BSizei,t + β7 ∙ NFirmi,t 
+ β8 ∙ NIndi,t + β9 ∙ Avg_Expi,t + β10 ∙ Avg_Sizei,t + β11 ∙ Avg_MTBi,t  






where Promotion proxies for analyst promotion from a low-status brokerage firm to a high-status 
brokerage firm, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves to a non-I.I. ranked brokerage 
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firm to a I.I.-ranked brokerage firm during year t, and zero otherwise. As in the test of All-Star 
analyst awards, for some control variables, we take the average of all firms in the analyst’s research 
portfolio during the year. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Analyst Skills and Earnings Forecast Accuracy  
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation (1). The mean of 
Connect is 0.338, suggesting 33.8% of the earnings forecasts are issued by well-connected analysts 
(those with connections more than 396). The median value of Tech_Skills is zero, indicating that 
over 50% of analysts do not have technical skills reported and endorsed within their top five types 
of expertise on LinkedIn. Consistent with prior literature, the median financial analyst issues four 
earnings forecasts, follows 16 firms within three industries, and has four years of firm specific 
experience. We winsorize the continuous variables at the top and bottom 1%. 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of Equation (1). In Table 4, column 1, where 
we only include the proxy for analysts’ social connections, the coefficient estimates on Connect is 
negative and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that well-connected analysts issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts. In column 2, where we only include the proxy for 
analysts’ technical skills, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on Tech_Skills (p-
value < 0.01), suggesting that the technical skills reported on the analysts’ LinkedIn profiles 
provide some indication of their research quality. In column 3, we continue to find the negative 
and significant coefficient estimates on Connect and Tech_Skills (both p-values < 0.01) when they 
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are simultaneously included in the model. In economic terms, based on the median beginning stock 
price ($39.77) in the sample, the presence of Connect is associated with a $0.06 decrease in 
forecast error, and each reported technical skill is on average associated with a $0.02 decrease in 
forecast error. Finally, in column 4, we control for analysts’ earnings forecast error for the firm in 
the previous year, and our inferences remain unchanged. For all regressions in this study, the t-
statistics or z-statistics are reported in parentheses and calculated based on standard errors 
clustered at broker level. Overall, these results are consistent with our hypothesis H1A that analysts 
with technical skills and social connections have better forecast accuracy. 
5.2. Analyst Skills and the Informativeness of Stock Recommendations 
 Table 3 also reports descriptive statistics for the additional variables in Equation (2). 
Consistent with prior literature, in our stock recommendation sample, the mean and median 
recommendation levels are 3.607 and 4, respectively, indicating that analysts tend to issue 
favorable recommendations for the firms they follow.  
Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of Equation (2). In Table 5, column 1, when 
we focus on analysts’ strong buy and buy recommendations, we find a positive and significant 
coefficient estimate on Connect (p-value < 0.1), suggesting that the buy stock recommendations 
issued by well-connected analysts on average are associated with 0.18% more positive stock 
returns. In column 2, when we focus on analysts’ hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations, we 
find a negative and significant coefficient estimate on Connect (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that 
the sell stock recommendations issued by well-connected analysts on average are associated with 
0.6% more negative stock returns. In columns 3 and 4, when we focus on recommendations 
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upgraded or downgraded from the same analysts’ prior recommendations, we find well-connected 
analysts’ stock recommendation upgrades are associated with 0.65% more positive and their 
downgrades are associated with 0.80% more negative stock returns. Interestingly, investors do not 
perceive the incremental benefit of analysts’ technical skills, as the coefficient on Tech_Skills is 
insignificant in all four columns. Overall, the results are consistent with our hypothesis H1B that 
analysts with more social connections issue more informative stock recommendations.5 
5.3. Analyst Skills and All-Star Award Status 
 Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation (3). In our analyst career 
outcome sample, 6.4% of the analysts are awarded the All-Star status at the end of year t, and 0.9% 
of the analysts are promoted from a non-I.I. ranked brokerage firm to a I.I. ranked brokerage firm. 
Based on our variable definitions, 27.8% of the analysts are well-connected. Our analyst career 
outcome sample is at the analyst-year level. The median financial analyst issues 3.6 earnings 
forecasts, follows 10 firms in a single industry, and has 3.3 years of firm specific experience.  
Table 7 reports the results from the estimation of Equation (3). In Table 7, column 1, where 
we only include the proxy for analysts’ connections, the coefficient estimate on Connect is positive 
and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that well-connected analysts are more likely to be 
voted as All-Star analysts relative to other analysts. In column 2, where we only include the proxy 
for analysts’ technical skills, we find an statistically insignificant coefficient estimate on 
Tech_Skills, suggesting that after controlling analysts’ average forecast accuracy, the incremental 
                                                 
5 To address the concern of confounding information events, we exclude stock recommendations issued within the 
(five-day) earnings announcement windows of the firms and the re-estimate Equation (2). The results highly similar 
and our inference remains unchanged.  
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benefit of technical skills is not valued by institutional investors. In column 3, when both social 
connections and technical skills variables are simultaneously included in the model, we continue 
to find a positive and significant coefficient estimate on Connect (p-value < 0.05). In terms of 
economic significance, the marginal effect at means for Connect is approximately 0.4%, which is 
approximately 6.3% of the mean of AA_Award. Finally, in column 4, we control for the average 
firm characteristics of an analyst’s research portfolio, and our inferences remain unchanged. 
Importantly, to address the concern that analysts may become well-connected after being awarded 
the All-Star status, we control for analysts’ award status in year t-1 in all empirical specifications. 
Overall, the results on analysts’ social connections are consistent with our hypotheses H2A that 
financial analysts with more social connections are more likely to be voted as All-Star analysts. 
5.4. Analyst Skills and Promotion to High-Status Brokerage Firms 
Table 6 reports that 0.9% of the analysts in our sample are promoted from non-I.I. 
brokerage firms to I.I. brokerage firms. Table 8 reports the results from the estimation of Equation 
(4). In column 1, where we only include the proxy for analysts’ social connections, the coefficient 
estimate on Connect is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that well-connected 
analysts are more likely to advance to high-status brokerage firms relative to other analysts. In 
column 2, where we only include the proxy for analysts’ technical skills, we find that after 
controlling analysts’ average forecast accuracy, analyst technical skills also provide incremental 
benefits in job separation, as the coefficient estimate on Tech_Skills is positive and significant (p-
value < 0.05). In column 3, when both the social connection and technical skills variables are 
simultaneously included in the model, we find a positive and significant coefficient estimate on 
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Connect (p-value < 0.01) but an insignificant coefficient estimate on Tech_Skills. The evidence 
suggests that social connection dominates technical skills in job separation. In terms of economic 
significance, the marginal effect at means for Connect is approximately 0.9%, which is 
approximately the mean of Promote. Finally, in column 4, when we control for the average firm 
characteristics of an analyst’s research portfolio, our inferences remain unchanged.  
5.5. Additional Analyses 
5.5.1 Addressing Measurement Error of Analyst Connections 
 For analysts whose LinkedIn pages cannot be found, we set the value of their connections 
to zero. However, this would introduce measurement errors to our connection variable, as those 
analysts may have some sorts of connections outside LinkedIn. To address this issue, we repeat 
the main analysis on a subsample which only contains the analysts with LinkedIn information, and 
we report the results in Table 9. The results based on this subsample are generally consistent with 
our main results: We continue to find that well-connected analysts issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts and more informative buy, sell, upgrade and downgrade recommendations; compared 
with other analysts, well-connected analysts are also more likely to be awarded the All-Star status 
and advance to a high-status brokerage firm. 
5.5.2 Alternative Earnings Forecast Measures 
To address the omitted variable problem for the earnings forecast accuracy test, we rely on 
two approaches to control for firm effects by (1) standardizing earnings forecast error and the 
determinants of forecast error to between 0 to 1, and by (2) measuring earnings forecast error and 
the determinants of forecast error after subtracting the corresponding firm-year mean (e.g., 
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Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999; Lim 2001; Clement and Tse 2003). By doing so, firm-level 
variables are dropped out of the empirical models. We then estimate an augmented version of 
Equation 1 and report the results in Table 10. Even when the alternative earnings forecast error 
measures are used, we still find that well-connected analysts are able to issue more accurate 
earnings forecasts. 
5.5.3 Analysts’ last earnings forecasts and stock recommendations 
We also re-estimate Equations (1) and (2) using the last (most recent) earnings forecast and 
stock recommendations issued by an analyst for a firm-year, and we report the estimation results 
in Table 11. We continue to find that both analysts’ social connections and technical skills 
contribute to earnings forecast accuracy and that well-connected analysts are able to issue more 
informative buy, sell, upgrade and downgrade recommendations. 
5.5.4 Alternative definition of social connections and technical skills 
We repeat the main analyses using an alternative cutoff of social connection, 
Connect_500+, which is equal to one if the analyst has more than 500 connections, and zero 
otherwise. Our results are generally robust (see Table 12). We continue to find that analysts with 
more connections issue relatively more accurate earnings forecasts and more informative stock 
recommendations, and are also more likely to be awarded the All-Star status and advance to a high-
status brokerage firm. 
To address the concern that LinkedIn network includes inactive connections or only reflects 
self-aggressiveness, we use the highest number of endorsements on analyst skills as an alternative 
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measure of social skills. In untabulated tests, we find consistent results that analysts with more 
endorsements have better performance and career advancement. 
In addition, we find that the results are robust to alternative definition of technique skills 
in untabulated analyses. The results are similar unaffected when we exclude comparative analysis 
or derivatives from technique skills. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether technical skills and social connections of financial 
analysts affect their performance and career advancement. Using a sample of LinkedIn profiles of 
financial analysts, we find that analysts with more social connections have lower forecast errors 
and more informative stock recommendation. Both buy and sell recommendations from analysts 
with more social connections have greater price impact on stock return. We further find that 
financial analysts with more social connections are more likely to be voted as All-Star, and are 
more likely to be promoted to high-status brokers. However, the effect of strong technical skills 
only appears in analyst earnings forecast accuracy. Technical skills have little impact on analysts’ 
career advancement. We find no evidence that analysts with strong technical skills are associated 
with more informative stock recommendation. In our opinion, the number of social connections 
should well reflect social skills of an analysts. In this regard, the above findings highlight the 
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Appendix: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables  
AFE Earnings forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the analyst’s 
earnings forecast for firm i minus firm i's actual EPS in year t, and then scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of year t. 
CAR[-1,+1]  Three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns surrounding the 
announcement date of the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm i in year t. 
AA_Award  All-Star analyst award, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked 
in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Promote Analyst promotion from a low-status brokerage firm to a high-status 
brokerage firm, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves from a 
non-I.I. ranked brokerage firm to an I.I. ranked brokerage firm during year t, 
and zero otherwise. 
Key independent variables  
Raw Connect Number of the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. 
Connect Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst has 
more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. 
Connect_500+ An indicator variable set to one if the analyst has more than 500 LinkedIn 
connections, and zero otherwise. 
Tech_Skills Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five 
skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn 
connections. 
Control variables  
Freq Earnings forecast frequency, calculated as the number of earnings forecasts 
issued by the analyst for firm i in year t. 
Horizon Earnings forecast horizon, defined as the number of days between the analyst’s 
earnings forecast for firm i and the announcement date of firm i’s actual EPS 
in year t. 
BSize Brokerage firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of 
analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. 
NFirm Number of firms that the analyst follows in year t. 
NInd Number of 2-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. 
Exp Firm-specific experience, defined as the number of years that the analyst has 
issued at least one earnings forecast for firm i prior to year t. 
Size Firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of market value of firm i at the 
end of year t. 
MTB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as market value of common equity divided 
by book value of common equity of firm i at the end of year t. 
ROA Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets at the end of year t. 
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Analyst-firm-years with EPS forecasts and unique 
I/B/E/S analyst IDs, 2014/1 - 2015/12 
103,912 5,698 7,112 
With I/B/E/S actual earnings information to calculate 
earnings forecast errors  
96,707 5,069 6,943 
With stock price information at the beginning of year t  73.114 4,028 4,794 
With financial data to calculate control variables 62,035 3,241 4,627 
Final earnings forecast sample       62,035 3,241 4,627 
 





Analyst Skills Reported on LinkedIn 
 
Panel A: Analysts’ connections 
Variable Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Raw Connect 0 222 396 500+ 500+ 
 
Panel B: Analysts’ skills 
Skill Percentage  Skill Percentage 
Equity Research 49%  Microsoft Excel 2% 
Financial Modelling 47%  Competitive Analysis 2% 
Equities 44%  Fixed Income 2% 
Valuation 43%  Research 1% 
Capital Markets 22%  Corporate Development 1% 
Investments 18%  Banking 1% 
Financial Analysis 15%  Mining 1% 
Investment Banking 13%  Strategic Planning 1% 
Hedge Funds 9%  Microsoft Office 1% 
Bloomberg 7%  Financial Markets 1% 
Equity Valuation 6%  Securities 1% 
Portfolio Management 6%  Derivatives 1% 
Finance 4%  Telecommunications 1% 
Corporate Finance 4%  Trading 1% 
Strategy 3%  Alternative Investments 1% 
Private Equity 3%  Market Research 1% 
Due Diligence 3%  Energy 1% 
Biotechnology 3%  Risk Management 1% 
Venture Capital 2%  Financial Services 1% 
Series 7 2%  Business Analysis 1% 
Management 2%  Healthcare 1% 
Asset Management 2%  PowerPoint 1% 
Emerging Markets 2%  Pharmaceutical Industry 1% 
Analysis 2%  Investor Relations 1% 
Business Strategy 2%  Economics 1% 
 
This table presents the analysts’ connections and skills reported on LinkedIn. Raw Connect = Raw number 




Descriptive Statistics - Analyst Performance Tests 
 
Variable Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
Earnings forecast accuracy tests (n = 62,035) 
AFE 0.016 0.037 0.002 0.005 0.014 
Connect 0.338 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tech_Skills 0.656 0.892 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Freq 4.168 2.479 2.000 4.000 5.000 
Horizon 5.657 0.484 5.659 5.886 5.900 
BSize 3.792 1.062 3.045 3.970 4.605 
NFirm 16.676 9.286 11.000 16.000 21.000 
NInd 3.232 2.368 1.000 3.000 4.000 
Exp 4.966 4.044 2.000 4.000 7.000 
Size 8.461 1.711 7.282 8.477 9.626 
MTB 4.820 6.341 1.818 3.005 5.158 
ROA 0.030 0.122 0.010 0.046 0.084 
Stock recommendation price impact tests (n = 17,697) 
Recom_Level 3.607 0.889 3.000 4.000 4.000 
CAR[-1,+1] -0.003 0.062 -0.022 0.000 0.023 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the tests of earnings forecast errors and 
market reactions to stock recommendation. AFE = Earnings forecast error, calculated as the absolute value 
of the analyst’s earnings forecast minus actual EPS for firm i in year t, and then scaled by the stock price at 
the beginning of year t. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst 
has more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., 
see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s 
LinkedIn connections. Freq = Earnings forecast frequency, calculated as the number of earnings forecasts 
issued by the analyst for firm i in year t. Horizon = Earnings forecast horizon, defined as the natural 
logarithm of the number of days between the analyst’s earnings forecast for firm i and the announcement 
date of firm i’s actual EPS in year t. BSize = Brokerage firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
number of analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. NFirm = Number of firms that the analyst 
follows in year t. NInd = Number of 2-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. Exp = Firm-
specific experience, defined as the number of years that the analyst has issued at least one earnings forecast 
for firm i prior to year t. AA_Award = All-Star analyst, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is 
ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero otherwise. Size = Firm 
size, measured as the natural logarithm of market value of firm i at the end of year t. MTB = Market-to-
book ratio, calculated as market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity of firm 
i at the end of year t. ROA = Return on assets, measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
total assets at the end of year t. Recom_Level = Analyst’s I/B/E/S recommendation, where strong buy is set 
to 5, buy is set to 4, hold is set to 3, sell is set to 2, and strong sell is set to 1. CAR[-1,+1] = Three-day 
cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns surrounding the announcement date of the analyst’s stock 




Analyst Skills and Earnings Forecast Accuracy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AFE AFE AFE AFE 
Intercept 0.0499*** 0.0502*** 0.0501*** 0.0396** 
 (6.11) (6.15) (6.12) (2.38) 
Connect -0.0019***  -0.0016*** -0.0005* 
 (-7.98)  (-6.05) (-1.73) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0008*** -0.0004*** -0.0003* 
  (-5.44) (-2.68) (-1.92) 
Freq 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0010*** 
 (2.32) (2.26) (2.33) (2.92) 
Horizon 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0025*** 
 (6.78) (6.81) (6.91) (2.64) 
BSize -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0004** 
 (-1.99) (-2.14) (-2.04) (-2.05) 
NFirm -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.52) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.61) 
NInd  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.34) (-0.39) 
Exp -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0001 
 (-2.14) (-2.17) (-2.18) (-1.59) 
Size -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0032*** 
 (-43.74) (-43.10) (-43.59) (-15.49) 
MTB -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003** 
 (-2.41) (-2.45) (-2.41) (-2.01) 
ROA -0.0669*** -0.0665*** -0.0668*** -0.0545*** 
 (-5.99) (-5.93) (-5.97) (-6.85) 
Lag_AFE    0.7630*** 
    (8.22) 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
N 62,035 62,035 62,035 44,666 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.314 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (1). AFE = Earnings forecast 
error, calculated as the absolute value of the analyst’s earnings forecast minus actual EPS for firm i in year 
t, and then scaled by the stock price at the beginning of year t. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an 
indicator variable set to one if the analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. 
Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by 
the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. All remaining variables are defined in the 
Appendix. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. 






Analyst Skills and the Informativeness of Stock Recommendations 
 
 Buy Sell Upgrade Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Intercept 0.0798*** -0.0569*** -0.0243** -0.0684*** 
 (3.73) (-5.88) (-2.18) (-3.26) 
Connect 0.0018* -0.0060*** 0.0065*** -0.0080* 
 (1.76) (-2.79) (2.78) (-1.82) 
Tech_Skills 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0024 
 (0.93) (0.05) (-1.02) (-1.37) 
BSize 0.0022*** -0.0000 0.0043*** -0.0062*** 
 (3.97) (-0.03) (4.72) (-4.32) 
NFirm -0.0001** -0.0001 0.0002** -0.0006*** 
 (-2.57) (-0.82) (2.17) (-3.20) 
NInd  -0.0003* -0.0008 -0.0013*** 0.0013* 
 (-1.70) (-1.53) (-3.48) (1.78) 
Exp 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0004* 0.0001 
 (3.39) (-0.69) (1.83) (0.27) 
Size -0.0051*** 0.0061*** -0.0091*** 0.0089*** 
 (-8.92) (8.50) (-7.70) (5.96) 
MTB -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0010*** 
 (-1.99) (-2.42) (-1.29) (-3.79) 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
N 8,894 8,803 1,557 1,404 
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.038 0.065 0.088 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the OLS regression of Equation (2). Buy = analysts’ strong 
buy and buy recommendations. Sell = analysts’ hold, sell, and strong sell recommendations. Upgrade = 
upgrade from the same analysts’ recommendations issued within one year. Downgrade = downgrade from 
the same analysts’ recommendations issued within one year. CAR[-1,+1] = Three-day cumulative abnormal 
size-adjusted returns surrounding the announcement date of the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm i 
in year t. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst has more than 
396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 
for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn 
connections. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. t-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated 
based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate two-tailed significance at the 10%, 





Descriptive Statistics - Analyst Career Path Tests 
 
Variable Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3 
n = 7,465      
AA_Award 0.064 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Promote 0.009 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Connect 0.278 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tech_Skills 0.547 0.842 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Avg_AFE 0.031 0.075 0.005 0.010 0.023 
Avg_CAR[-1,+1] -0.002 0.042 -0.008 0.000 0.008 
Avg_Freq 3.843 1.967 2.500 3.615 4.714 
BSize 3.709 1.156 2.931 3.888 4.605 
NFirm 10.684 8.012 3.000 10.000 16.000 
NInd 2.101 1.738 1.000 1.000 3.000 
Avg_Exp 4.003 2.676 1.875 3.308 5.550 
Avg_Size 8.880 1.560 7.906 9.046 9.966 
Avg_MTB 5.229 7.141 1.842 3.312 5.634 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample used in the tests of analysts’ career paths. AA_Award 
= All-Star analyst, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up 
by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero otherwise. Promote = Analyst promotion to a high-status broker, 
an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves from a non-I.I. ranked broker to an I.I. ranked broker 
during year t, and zero otherwise. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the 
analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical 
skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the 
analyst’s LinkedIn connections. Avg_AFE = Average earnings forecast accuracy, calculated as the mean of 
the analyst’s price-deflated earnings forecast errors in year t. Avg_CAR[-1,+1] = Average price impact of 
stock recommendations, calculated as the mean of the three-day cumulative abnormal market-adjusted 
stock returns surrounding the analyst’s stock recommendations in year t. Avg_Freq = Average earnings 
forecast frequency, calculated as the mean of the number of earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the 
firms followed in year t. BSize = Brokerage firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of 
analysts employed by the sell-side firm in year t. NFirm = Number of firms that the analyst follows in year 
t. NInd = Number of 2-digit SIC industries that the analyst follows in year t. Avg_Exp = Average firm-
specific experience, defined as the mean of the number of years that the analyst has followed the firms in 
his or her portfolio in year t. Avg_Size = Average firm size, measured as the mean of the natural logarithm 
of market value of the firms that the analyst follows in year t. Avg_MTB = Average market-to-book ratio, 





Analyst Skills and All-Star Analyst Awards 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award 
Intercept -4.8170*** -4.7487*** -4.7824*** -6.1026*** 
 (-9.57) (-9.32) (-9.11) (-19.93) 
Connect 0.1939*  0.2392** 0.2207** 
 (1.78)  (2.51) (2.51) 
Tech_Skills  0.0011 -0.0592 -0.0618 
  (0.02) (-1.37) (-1.38) 
Avg_AFE -1.1174*** -1.0683*** -1.1207*** -0.1824*** 
 (-17.54) (-5.29) (-7.63) (-3.01) 
Avg_CAR[-1,+1] -0.8001* -0.8664** -0.8037* -0.7914* 
 (-1.85) (-1.99) (-1.81) (-1.70) 
Avg_Freq 0.1059*** 0.1062*** 0.1052*** 0.0991*** 
 (25.31) (18.60) (20.48) (14.57) 
BSize 0.2592*** 0.2618*** 0.2572*** 0.2522*** 
 (3.42) (3.33) (3.35) (3.05) 
NFirm 0.0426*** 0.0433*** 0.0426*** 0.0454*** 
 (5.50) (5.93) (5.48) (6.51) 
NInd  0.0619*** 0.0620*** 0.0629*** 0.0603*** 
 (4.00) (4.04) (4.13) (3.87) 
Lag_AA_Award 2.8227*** 2.8285*** 2.8153*** 2.7484*** 
 (32.21) (31.47) (32.46) (35.19) 
Avg_Exp 0.0389*** 0.0347*** 0.0379*** 0.0298*** 
 (5.47) (4.41) (4.91) (2.83) 
Avg_Size    0.1395*** 
    (3.26) 
Avg_MTB    0.0071 
    (1.44) 
N 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,179 
Pseudo R-squared 0.700 0.699 0.701 0.704 
This table presents the results from estimating the Probit regression of Equation (3). AA_Award = All-Star analyst, 
an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up by Institutional Investor 
in year t, and zero otherwise. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst has 
more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 
2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. 
Avg_AFE = Average earnings forecast accuracy, calculated as the mean of the analyst’s price-deflated earnings 
forecast errors in year t. Avg_CAR[-1,+1] = Average price impact of stock recommendations, calculated as the 
mean of the three-day cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns surrounding the analyst’s stock 
recommendations in year t. Avg_Freq = Average earnings forecast frequency, calculated as the mean of the number 
of earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the firms followed in year t. Avg_Exp = Average firm-specific 
experience, defined as the mean of the number of years that the analyst has followed the firms in his or her portfolio 
in year t. Avg_Size = Average firm size, measured as the mean of the natural logarithm of market value of the firms 
that the analyst follows in year t. Avg_MTB = Average market-to-book ratio, calculated as the mean of the market-
to-book ratios of the firms that the analyst follows in year t. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. 
z-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate 




Analyst Skills and Promotion to High-Status Brokerage Firms  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Promote Promote Promote Promote 
Intercept -3.1813*** -3.1455*** -3.1848*** -6.0947*** 
 (-28.64) (-27.96) (-27.74) (-13.65) 
Connect 0.3887***  0.3812*** 0.3679*** 
 (4.14)  (3.37) (2.97) 
Tech_Skills  0.1032** 0.0092 0.0359 
  (2.13) (0.15) (0.53) 
Avg_AFE 0.1417 0.1132 0.1412 1.3538*** 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (2.80) 
Avg_CAR[-1,+1] -0.5010 -0.5744 -0.4950 -0.0635 
 (-0.51) (-0.58) (-0.51) (-0.05) 
Avg_Freq 0.0373* 0.0392* 0.0373* 0.0105 
 (1.77) (1.91) (1.78) (0.46) 
BSize 0.1737*** 0.1762*** 0.1739*** 0.1802*** 
 (8.31) (8.56) (8.18) (7.04) 
NFirm -0.0279*** -0.0248*** -0.0280*** -0.0292*** 
 (-3.80) (-3.64) (-3.89) (-3.72) 
NInd  -0.0175 -0.0164 -0.0177 -0.0148 
 (-0.54) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.37) 
Avg_Exp     
     
Avg_Size 0.0349** 0.0337** 0.0351** 0.0079 
 (2.03) (2.01) (2.04) (0.43) 
Avg_MTB    0.3226*** 
    (7.35) 
N 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,179 
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.046 0.062 0.151 
 
This table presents the results from estimating the Probit regression of Equation (4). Promote = Analyst promotion to 
a high-status broker, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves from a non-I.I. ranked broker to an I.I. 
ranked broker during year t, and zero otherwise. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one 
if the analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills 
(i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn 
connections. Avg_AFE = Average earnings forecast accuracy, calculated as the mean of the analyst’s price-deflated 
earnings forecast errors in year t. Avg_CAR[-1,+1] = Average price impact of stock recommendations, calculated as the 
mean of the three-day cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns surrounding the analyst’s stock 
recommendations in year t. Avg_Freq = Average earnings forecast frequency, calculated as the mean of the number of 
earnings forecasts issued by the analyst for the firms followed in year t. Avg_Exp = Average firm-specific experience, 
defined as the mean of the number of years that the analyst has followed the firms in his or her portfolio in year t. 
Avg_Size = Average firm size, measured as the mean of the natural logarithm of market value of the firms that the analyst 
follows in year t. Avg_MTB = Average market-to-book ratio, calculated as the mean of the market-to-book ratios of the 
firms that the analyst follows in year t. All remaining variables are defined in the Appendix. z-statistics (in parenthesis) 
are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 






Alternative Sample: Excluding Non-LinkedIn Analysts 
Panel. A: Analyst skills and earnings forecast accuracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AFE AFE AFE AFE 
Intercept 0.0508*** 0.0510*** 0.0510*** 0.0399*** 
 (6.78) (6.78) (6.79) (3.29) 
Connect -0.0013***  -0.0012*** -0.0004* 
 (-5.16)  (-4.27) (-1.66) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0003* 
  (-3.20) (-1.30) (-1.73) 
Lag_AFE No No No Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 56,392 56,392 56,392 41,723 
Adj. R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.310 
 
Panel B: Analyst skills and the informativeness of stock recommendations 
 Buy Sell Upgrade Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Intercept 0.0801*** -0.0552*** -0.0239* -0.0650*** 
 (3.75) (-5.63) (-1.89) (-3.02) 
Connect 0.0018* -0.0058*** 0.0068*** -0.0082* 
 (1.71) (-2.66) (2.88) (-1.88) 
Tech_Skills 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0024 
 (0.78) (0.13) (-1.06) (-1.33) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,659 8,607 1,541 1,389 
Adj. R-squared 0.044 0.038 0.068 0.089 
 
Panel C: Analyst Skills and All-Star Analyst Awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award 
Intercept -4.7057*** -4.6133*** -4.6541*** -6.1164*** 
 (-8.47) (-8.16) (-7.98) (-20.83) 
Connect 0.1476  0.2019** 0.1791** 
 (1.32)  (2.11) (2.06) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0273 -0.0753* -0.0791* 
  (-0.49) (-1.70) (-1.74) 
Firm Controls No No No Yes 
Analyst and Broker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,968 5,968 5,968 5,807 







Panel D: Analyst promotion to high-status brokerage firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Promote  Promote  Promote  Promote  
Intercept -3.1304*** -3.0438*** -3.1344*** -5.7114*** 
 (-7.75) (-6.79) (-7.32) (-7.35) 
Connect 0.3848***  0.3805*** 0.3464*** 
 (3.95)  (3.02) (2.91) 
Tech_Skills  0.0841* 0.0062 0.0203 
  (1.77) (0.10) (0.34) 
Firm Controls No No No Yes 
Analyst and Broker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,968 5,968 5,968 5,807 
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.044 0.062 0.134 
 
This table presents the results of re-estimating Equations (1) to (4) on an alternative sample where all 
analysts have information available on LinkedIn. AFE = Earnings forecast error, calculated as the absolute 
value of the analyst’s earnings forecast minus actual EPS for firm i in year t, and then scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of year t. CAR[-1,+1] = Three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns 
surrounding the announcement date of the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm i in year t. AA_Award 
= All-Star analyst, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up 
by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero otherwise. Promote = Analyst promotion to a high-status broker, 
an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves from a non-I.I. ranked broker to an I.I. ranked broker 
during year t, and zero otherwise. Connect = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the 
analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical 
skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the 
analyst’s LinkedIn connections. Analyst, broker, and firm-level controls are as specified in Equations (1) 
to (4), respectively.  t- or z-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the 







Robustness Checks: Alternative Earnings Forecast Error Measures 
Panel. A: Standardized earnings forecast errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable RAFE RAFE RAFE RAFE 
Intercept 0.2179*** 0.2153*** 0.2172*** 0.2682*** 
 (28.13) (26.73) (26.76) (37.06) 
Connect -0.0186***  -0.0198*** -0.0212*** 
 (-4.71)  (-5.95) (-5.80) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0028 0.0016 0.0009 
  (-1.32) (0.87) (0.76) 
Lag_RAFE No No No Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 60,578 60,578 60,578 43,812 
Adj. R-squared 0.079 0.078 0.079 0.027 
 
Panel B: Mean-adjusted earnings forecast errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable MAFE MAFE MAFE MAFE 
Intercept -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001*** 
 (-0.20) (-1.10) (-0.44) (3.04) 
Connect -0.0002*  -0.0003*** -0.0002* 
 (-1.92)  (-2.90) (-1.73) 
Tech_Skills  0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 
  (0.09) (1.52) (-0.24) 
Lag_MAFE No No No Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 62,043 62,043 62,043 44,666 
Adj. R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.012 
 
This table presents the results of re-estimating Equation (1) using alternative earnings forecast error 
measures. RAFE = Standardized earnings forecast error, calculated as the analyst’s earnings forecast error 
minus the minimum earnings forecast error of analysts following firm i in year t, and then scaled by the 
range of  earnings forecast error of analysts following firm i in year t. MAFE = Mean-adjusted earnings 
forecast accuracy, calculated as the analyst’s earnings forecast error minus the mean earnings forecast error 
of analysts following firm i in year t, and then scaled by the stock price at the beginning of year t. Connect 
= Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn 
connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) 
within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. 
Analyst and broker-level controls are included and standardized/mean-adjusted. t-statistics (in parenthesis) 
are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 







Robustness Checks: Analysts’ Last Earnings Forecasts and Stock Recommendations 
Panel. A: Analyst skills and earnings forecast accuracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AFE AFE AFE AFE 
Intercept 0.0363*** 0.0365*** 0.0366*** 0.0261** 
 (3.05) (3.08) (3.08) (1.99) 
Connect -0.0011***  -0.0007*** -0.0000 
 (-5.81)  (-4.41) (-0.07) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0006*** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** 
  (-6.25) (-5.55) (-3.22) 
Lag_AFE No No No Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 62,014 62,014 62,014 44,654 
Adj. R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.261 
 
Panel B: Analyst skills and the informativeness of stock recommendations 
 Buy Sell Upgrade Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Intercept 0.0841*** -0.0719*** 0.0868*** -0.0670*** 
 (4.56) (-5.63) (5.20) (-7.50) 
Connect 0.0030*** -0.0050** 0.0071*** -0.0063*** 
 (2.87) (-1.98) (3.28) (-3.54) 
Tech_Skills -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0039** 0.0035* 
 (-0.61) (0.44) (-2.51) (1.67) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,801 8,908 2,402 2,386 
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.049 0.058 0.094 
 
This table the results of re-estimating Equations (1) and (2) using analysts’ last earnings forecasts and 
recommendations, respectively, for firm i in year t. AFE = Earnings forecast error, calculated as the absolute 
value of the analyst’s earnings forecast minus actual EPS for firm i in year t, and then scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of year t. CAR[-1,+1] = Three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns 
surrounding the announcement date of the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm i in year t. Connect = 
Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst has more than 396 LinkedIn 
connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) 
within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed by the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. 
Analyst, broker, and firm-level controls are as specified in Equations (1) and (2), respectively. t-statistics 
(in parenthesis) are calculated based on standard errors clustered at the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate 







Alternative Connection Measure 
Panel. A: Analyst skills and earnings forecast accuracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AFE AFE AFE AFE 
Intercept 0.0496*** 0.0502*** 0.0499*** 0.0349* 
 (6.09) (6.15) (6.12) (1.89) 
Connect_500+ -0.0017***  -0.0013*** -0.0005** 
 (-6.82)  (-4.56) (-1.97) 
Tech_Skills  -0.0008*** -0.0005*** -0.0004** 
  (-5.44) (-3.58) (-2.30) 
Lag_AFE No No No Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 62,035 62,035 62,035 44,666 
Adj. R-squared 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.334 
 
Panel B: Analyst skills and the informativeness of stock recommendations 
 Buy Sell Upgrade Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] 
Intercept 0.0803*** -0.0578*** -0.0244** -0.0694*** 
 (3.78) (-5.97) (-2.21) (-3.29) 
Connect_500+ 0.0015 -0.0065*** 0.0057** -0.0085*** 
 (1.21) (-3.32) (2.48) (-2.80) 
Tech_Skills 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0029 
 (1.47) (-0.17) (-0.92) (-1.56) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,894 8,803 1,557 1,404 
Adj. R-squared 0.043 0.038 0.065 0.088 
 
Panel C: Analyst Skills and All-Star Analyst Awards 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award AA_Award 
Intercept -4.8430*** -4.7487*** -4.8036*** -6.0551*** 
 (-9.46) (-9.32) (-9.05) (-21.30) 
Connect_500+ 0.2640**  0.3135*** 0.2805*** 
 (2.14)  (2.81) (2.63) 
Tech_Skills  0.0011 -0.0678* -0.0678 
  (0.02) (-1.68) (-1.64) 
Firm Controls No No No Yes 
Analyst and Broker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,179 







Panel D: Analyst promotion to more accurate brokerage firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Promote Promote  Promote  Promote  
Intercept -3.1498*** -3.1455*** -3.1640*** -5.9948*** 
 (-29.50) (-27.96) (-28.02) (-13.73) 
Connect_500+ 0.3813***  0.3562*** 0.2780** 
 (3.85)  (3.17) (2.27) 
Tech_Skills  0.1032** 0.0326 0.0705 
  (2.13) (0.57) (1.12) 
Firm Controls No No No Yes 
Analyst and Broker Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,465 7,465 7,465 7,179 
Pseudo R-squared 0.059 0.046 0.059 0.145 
 
This table presents the results of re-estimating Equations (1) to (4) on an alternative sample where all 
analysts have information available on LinkedIn. AFE = Earnings forecast error, calculated as the absolute 
value of the analyst’s earnings forecast minus actual EPS for firm i in year t, and then scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of year t. CAR[-1,+1] = Three-day cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns 
surrounding the announcement date of the analyst’s stock recommendation for firm i in year t. AA_Award 
= All-Star analyst, an indicator variable set to one if the analyst is ranked in the top three or as a runner-up 
by Institutional Investor in year t, and zero otherwise. Promote = Analyst promotion to a high-status broker, 
an indicator variable set to one if the analyst moves from a non-I.I. ranked broker to an I.I. ranked broker 
during year t, and zero otherwise. Connect_500+ = Well-connected analysts, an indicator variable set to 
one if the analyst has more than 500 LinkedIn connections, and zero otherwise. Tech_Skills = Number of 
technical skills (i.e., see Table 2 for details) within the top five skills reported by the analyst and endorsed 
by the analyst’s LinkedIn connections. Analyst, broker, and firm-level controls are as specified in Equations 
(1) to (4), respectively. t- or z-statistics (in parenthesis) are calculated based on standard errors clustered at 
the broker level. *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
